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Abstract
This paper deals with three tools to compare proof-theoretic strength of formal
arithmetical theories: interpretability, Π0
1
-conservativity and proving restricted consis-
tency. It is well known that under certain conditions these three notions are equivalent
and this equivalence is often referred to as the Orey-Ha´jek characterization of inter-
pretability.
In this paper we look with detail at the Orey-Ha´jek characterization and study what
conditions are needed and in what meta-theory the characterizations can be formalized.
1 Introduction
Interpretations are everywhere used in mathematics and mathematical logic. Basically, a
theory U interprets a theory V –we write U ✄ V – whenever there is some translation from
the symbols of the language of V to formulas of the language of U so that under a natural
extension of this translation the axioms of V are mapped to theorems of U .
The corresponding intuition should be that U is at least as strong or expressible as
V . And indeed, interpretations are used for example to give relative consistency proofs
or to establish undecidability of theories. As such, interpretations are considered an im-
portant metamathematical notion. Probably, the first time that interpretations received
a formal and systematic treatment has been in the book by A. Tarski, A. Mostowski and
R. Robinson ([17]). In the current paper we will study that notion of interpretability and
also some related notions. Sometimes we speak of relative interpretability as to indicate
that quantifications become relativized to some domain specifier as we shall define precisely
later on.
We will relate the notion of relative interpretability to two other basic metamathemat-
ical notions. The first such notion is the notion of consistency. The notion of consistency
is central to mathematical logic and considered key and fundamental.
A second notion is that of Π01 conservativity. Below we will exactly define what Π
0
1
formulas are, but basically, those are formulas in the language of arithmetic which are of
the form ∀xψ(x) where ψ is some decidable predicate. On the other hand, Σ01 formulas
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are those of the form ∃xψ(x) for decidable ψ. Since all true theories prove exactly the
same set of Σ01 sentences, the first natural and interesting class of formulas to distinguish
theories is on the Π01 level. Therefore, the notion of Π
0
1 conservativity has been very
central in mathematical logic and foundational discussions. We say that a theory U is Π01
conservative over V whenever any Π01 sentence provable by V is also provable by U .
The main purpose of this paper is to discuss how these three different notions are
related to each other in certain circumstances. This relation is known as the Orey-Ha´jek
characterization of relative interpretability.
As such, the paper contains many well-known results and various formulations are taken
from [8]. However, we think that it is instructive that all these results are put together
and moreover that a clear focus is on the requirements needed so that various implications
are formalizable in weak theories.
Apart from the main focus –which is bringing together facts of the Orey-Ha´jek char-
acterization of relative interpretability and formalizations thereof– the paper contains a
collection of new observations that might come in handy. For example, our simple gener-
alization of Pudla´k’s lemma as formulated in Lemma 5.5 has been a main tool in proving
arithmetical correctness of a new series of interpretability principles in [9].
2 Preliminaries
As mentioned before, a central notion in this paper is that of consistency. Consistency is a
notion that concerns syntax: no sequence of symbols that constitute a proof will yield the
conclusion that 0 = 1. It shall be an important criterion whether or not a theory proves
the consistency of another. As such we want that theories can talk about syntax.
The standard choice to represent syntax is by Go¨del numbering, assigning natural num-
bers to syntax. Thus, our theories should contain a modicum of arithmetic. In this section
we shall make some basic observations on coding and then fix what minimal arithmetic we
should have in our base theory. We shall formulate some fundamental properties of this
base theory and refer to the literature for further background. Further, we shall fix the
notation that is used in the remainder of this paper.
2.1 A short word on coding
Formalization calls for coding of syntax. At some places in this paper we shall need
estimates of codes of syntactical objects. Therefore it is good to discuss the nature of the
coding process we will employ. However we shall not consider the implementation details
of our coding.
We shall code strings over some finite alphabet A with cardinality a. A typical coding
protocol could be the following. First we define an alphabetic order on A. Next we
enumerate all finite strings over A in the following way (pseudo-lexicographic order).
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To start, we enumerate all strings of length 0, then of length 1, etcetera. For every
n, we enumerate the strings of length n in alphabetic order. The coding of a finite string
over A will just be its ordinal number in this enumeration. We shall now see some easy
arithmetical properties of this coding. We shall often refrain from distinguishing syntactical
objects and their codes.
1. There are an many strings of length n.
2. There are an + an−1 · · · + 1 = a
n+1−1
a−1 many strings of length ≤ n.
3. From (2) it follows that the code of a syntactical object of length n, is O(a
n+1−1
a−1 ) =
O(an) big.
4. Conversely, the length of a syntactical object that has code ϕ isO(|ϕ|) (logarithm/length
of ϕ) big.
5. If ϕ and ψ are codes of syntactical objects, the concatenation ϕ ⋆ ψ of ϕ and ψ is
O(ϕ·ψ) big. For, |ϕ ⋆ ψ| = |ϕ|+|ψ|, whence by (3), ϕ ⋆ ψ ≈ a|ϕ|+|ψ| = a|ϕ|·a|ψ| = ϕ·ψ.
6. If ϕ and t are (codes of) syntactical objects, then ϕx(t) is O(ϕ
|t|) big. Here ϕx(t)
denotes the syntactical object that results from ϕ by replacing every (unbounded)
occurrence of x by t. The length of ϕ is about |ϕ|. In the worst case, these are all
x-symbols. In this case, the length of ϕx(t) is |ϕ| · |t| and thus ϕx(t) is O(a
|ϕ|·|t|) =
O(t|ϕ|) = O(ϕ|t|) = O(2|ϕ|·|t|) big.
As mentioned, we shall refrain from the technical characteristics of our coding and refer
to the literature for examples. Rather, we shall keep in mind restrictions on the sizes and
bounds as mentioned above. Also, we shall assume that we work with a natural poly-time
coding with poly-time decoding functions so that the code of substrings is always smaller
than the code of the entire string.
2.2 Arithmetical theories
Since substitution is key to manipulating syntax we need, by our observations above, a
function whose growth-rate can capture substitution. Thus, we choose to work with the
smash function ♯ defined by x♯y := 2|x|·|y| where |x| := ⌈log2(x + 1)⌉ is the length of
the number x in binary. We shall often also employ the function ω1 which is of similar
growth-rate and defined by ω1(x) := 2
|x|2 .
Next, we need a certain amount of induction. For a formula ϕ, the regular induction
formula Iϕ is given by
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ 1)) → ∀x ϕ(x).
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However, it turns out that we can work with a weaker version of induction called polynomial
induction denoted by PIND:
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(⌊
1
2
x⌋)→ ϕ(x)) → ∀x ϕ(x)
or equivalently
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(2x)) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(2x+1)) → ∀x ϕ(x).
The idea is that one can conclude ϕ(x) by only logarithmically many calls upon the in-
duction hypothesis with this PIND principle. For example to conclude ϕ(18) we’ld go
ϕ(0)→ ϕ(1)→ ϕ(2)→ ϕ(4)→ ϕ(9)→ ϕ(18).
Typically, induction on syntax is of this nature and in order to conclude a property of
(the Go¨del number of) some formula ψ we need to apply the induction hypothesis to the
number of subformulas of ψ which is linear in the length of ψ. Thus, most inductions over
syntax can be established by PIND rather than the regular induction schema.
Moreover, we shall restrict the formulas on which we allow ourselves to apply PIND
to so to end up with a weak base theory. As we shall see, most of our arguments can be
formalized within Buss’ theory1 S1
2
.
The theory S1
2
is formulated in the language of arithmetic {0, S,+, ·, ♯, |x|, ⌊12x⌋,≤}.
Apart from some basic axioms that define the symbols in the language, S1
2
is axiomatized
by PIND induction for Σb1 formulas. The Σ
b
1 formulas are those formed from atomic
formulas via the boolean operators, sharply bounded quantification and bounded existential
quantification. Sharply bounded quantification is quantification of the from Q x<|t| for
Q ∈ {∀,∃}. Bounded existential quantification in contrast, is of the form ∃x<t. We refer
the reader for [1] or [6] for further details and for the definitions of the related Σbn and Π
b
n
hierarchies.
Equivalent to the PIND principle (see [11, Lemma 5.2.5]) is the length induction prin-
ciple LIND:
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+1)) → ∀x ϕ(|x|).
So, from the progressiveness of ϕ, we can conclude ϕ(x) for any x for which the exponentia-
tion is defined. We shall later see that if we are working with definable cuts (definable initial
segments of the natural numbers with some natural closure properties) we can without loss
of generality assume that exponentiation is defined for elements of this cut.
Although most of our reasoning can be performed in S1
2
, we sometimes mention stronger
theories. As always Peano Arithmetic (PA) contains open axioms that define the symbols
0, S,+ and · and induction axioms Iϕ for any arithmetical formula ϕ. Similarly, IΣn is as
PA where instead we only have induction axioms Iϕ for ϕ ∈ Σn. Here, Σn refers to the
1As mentioned, the substitution operation on codes of syntactical objects asks for a function of growth
rate x|x|. In Buss’s S12 this is the smash function ♯. In the theory I∆0 + Ω1 this is the function ω1(x).
However, contrary to S12, the theory I∆0 + Ω1 –aka S2– is not known to be finitely axiomatizable.
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usual arithmetical hierarchy (see e.g. [6]) in that such formulas are written as a decidable
formula preceded by a string of n alternating quantifiers with an existential quantifier up
front. In case no free variables are allowed in the induction formulas, we flag this by a
superscript “−” as in IΣ−n .
Another important arithmetical principle that we will encounter frequently is collection.
For example BΣn is the so-called collection scheme for Σn-formulae. Roughly, BΣn says
that the range of a Σn-definable function on a finite interval is again finite. A mathematical
formulation is ∀x≤u∃y σ(x, y)→ ∃z ∀x≤u∃ y≤z σ(x, y) where σ(x, y) ∈ Σn may contain
other variables too.
The least number principle LΓ for a class of formulas is the collection ∃x ϕ(x) →
∃x (ϕ(x) ∧ ∀ y<x ¬ϕ(y)) for ϕ ∈ Γ.
2.3 Numberized theories
The notion of interpretability applies to any pair of theories and not necessarily need
they contain any arithmetic. However, in this paper we will prove that U ✄ V can in
various occasions be equivalent to other properties that are stated in terms of numbers.
For example, in certain situations we have that U ✄ V is equivalent to U proving all the
Π01 formulas that V does. Clearly, in this situation we should understand that U and V
come with a natural interpretation of numbers.
Definition 2.1. We will call a pair 〈U, k〉 a numberized theory if k : U ✄ S12. A theory U
is numberizable or arithmetical if for some j, 〈U, j〉 is a numberized theory.
From now on, we shall only consider numberizable or numberized theories. Often
however, we will fix a numberization j and reason about the theory 〈U, j〉 as if it were
formulated in the language of arithmetic.
A disadvantage of doing so is clearly that our statements may be somehow misleading;
when we think of, e.g., ZFC we do not like to think of it as coming with a fixed numberiza-
tion. However, for the kind of characterizations treated in this paper, it is really needed to
have numbers around. We shall most of the times work with sequential theories. Basically,
sequentiality means that any finite sequence of objects can be coded.
2.4 Metamathematics in numberized theories
On many occasions, we want to represent numbers by terms (numerals) and then consider
the code of that term. It is not a good idea to represent a number n by
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
S . . . S 0.
For, the length of this object is n + 1 whence its code is about 2n+1 and we would like to
avoid the use of exponentiation. In the setting of weaker arithmetics it is common practice
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to use so-called efficient numerals. These numerals are defined by recursion as follows.
0 = 0; 2·n = (SS0) · n and 2·n+ 1 = S((SS0) · n). Clearly, these numerals implement the
system of dyadic notation which perfectly ties up with the PIND principle. Often we shall
refrain between distinguishing n from its numeral n or even the Go¨del number pnq of its
numeral.
As we want to do arithmetization of syntax, our theories should be coded in a simple
way. We will assume that all our theories U have an axiom set that is decidable in poly-
nomial time. That is, there is some formula AxiomU (x) which is ∆
b
1 (both the formula and
its negation are provably equivalent to a Σb1 formula) in S
1
2
, with
S1
2
⊢ AxiomU (ϕ) iff ϕ is an axiom of U .
The choice of ∆b1-axiomatizations is also motivated by Lemma 2.2 below. Most natural the-
ories like ZFC or PA indeed have ∆b1-axiomatizations. Moreover, by a sharpening of Craig’s
trick, any recursive theory is deductively equivalent to one with a ∆b1-axiomatization.
We shall employ the standard techniques and concepts necessary for the arithmetization
of syntax. Thus, we shall work with provability predicates ✷U corresponding uniformly to
arithmetical theories U . We shall adhere to the standard dot notation so that, for example,
✷Uϕ(x˙) denotes a formula with one free variable x so that for each value of x, ✷Uϕ(x˙) is
provably equivalent to ✷Uϕ(x).
We shall always write the formalized version of a concept in sans-serif style. For exam-
ple, ProofU (p, ϕ) stands for the formalization of “p is a U -proof of ϕ”, Con(U) stands for
the formalization of “U is a consistent theory” and so forth. It is known that for theories
U with a poly-time axiom set, the formula ProofU (p, ϕ) can be taken to be in ∆
b
1 being a
poly-time decidable predicate. Again, [1] and [6] are adequate references.
For already really weak theories T we have Σ1-completeness in the sense that T proves
any true Σ1 sentence. However, proofs of Σ1-sentences σ are multi-exponentially big, that
is, 2σn for some n depending on σ. (See e.g., [6].) As such, we cannot expect that we can
formalize the Σ1 completeness theorem in theories where exponentiation is not necessarily
total.
However, for ∃Σb1-formulas we do have a completeness theorem (see [1]) in bounded
arithmetic. From now on, we shall often write a sup-index to a quantifier to specify the
domain of quantification.
Lemma 2.2. If α(x) ∈ ∃Σb1, then there is some standard natural number n such that
S12 ⊢ ∀x [α(x)→ ∃ p<ω
n
1 (x) ProofU (p, α(x˙))].
This holds for any reasonable arithmetical theory U . Moreover, we have also a formalized
version of this statement.
S12 ⊢ ∀
∃Σb1α ∃n ✷S1
2
(∀x [α˙(x)→ ∃ p<ωn˙1 (x) ProofU (p, α˙(x˙))]).
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2.5 Consistency and reflexive theories
Since Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, we know that no recursive theory that is
consistent can prove its own consistency. For a large class of natural theories we do have
a good approximation of proving consistency though. A theory is reflexive if it proves
the consistency of all of its finite subtheories. Reflexivity is a natural notion and most
natural non-finitely axiomatized theories are reflexive like, for example, primitive recursive
arithmetic and PA.
Many meta-mathematical statements involve the notion of reflexivity. There exist var-
ious ways in which reflexivity can be formalized, and throughout the literature we can find
many different formalizations. For stronger theories, all these formalizations coincide. But
for weaker theories, the differences are essential. We give some formalizations of reflexivity.
1. ∀n U ⊢ Con(U [n]) where U [n] denotes the conjunction of the first n axioms of U .
2. ∀n U ⊢ Con(U↾n) where Con(U↾n) denotes that there is no proof of falsity using only
axioms of U with Go¨del numbers ≤ n.
3. ∀n U ⊢ Conn(U) where Conn(U) denotes that there is no proof of falsity with a proof
p where p has the following properties. All non-logical axioms of U that occur in p
have Go¨del numbers ≤ n. All formulas ϕ that occur in p have a logical complexity
ρ(ϕ) ≤ n.
Here ρ is some complexity measure that basically counts the number of quantifier
alternations in ϕ. Important features of this ρ are that for every n, there are truth
predicates for formulas with complexity n. Moreover, the ρ-measure of a formula
should be more or less (modulo some poly-time difference, see Remark 3.4) preserved
under translations. An example of such a ρ is given in [19].
It is clear that (2)⇒ (3) can be proven in any weak base theory. For the corresponding
provability notions, the implication reverses. In this paper, our notion of reflexivity shall
be the third one.
We shall write ✷U,nϕ for ¬Conn(U + ¬ϕ) or, equivalently, ∃p ProofU,n(p, ϕ). Here,
ProofU,n(p, ϕ) denotes that p is a U -proof of ϕ with all axioms in p are ≤ n and for all
formulas ψ that occur in p, we have ρ(ψ) ≤ n.
Remark 2.3. An inspection of the proof of provable Σ1-completeness (Lemma 2.2) gives
us some more information. The proof p that witnesses the provability in U of some ∃Σb1-
sentence α, can easily be taken so that all axioms occurring in p are about as big and com-
plex as α. Thus, from α, we get for some n (depending linearly on α) that ProofU,n(p, α).
If we wish to emphasize the fact that our theories are not necessarily in the language of
arithmetic, but just can be numberized, our formulations of reflexivity should be slightly
changed. For example, (3) will for some 〈U, j〉 look like j : U ✄ S1
2
+ {Conn(U) | n ∈ ω}.
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If U is a reflexive theory, we do not necessarily have any reflection principles. That
is, we do not have U ⊢ ✷V ϕ → ϕ for some natural V ⊂ U and for some natural class of
formulae ϕ. We do have, however, a weak form of ∀Πb1-reflection. This is expressed in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. Let U be a reflexive theory. Then
S12 ⊢ ∀
∀Πb1π ∀n ✷U∀x (✷U,nπ(x˙)→ π(x)).
Proof. Reason in S1
2
and fix π and n. Let m be such that we have (see Lemma 2.2 and
Remark 2.3)
✷U∀x (¬π(x)→ ✷U,m¬π(x˙)).
Furthermore, let k := max{n,m}. Now, reason in U , fix some x and assume ✷U,nπ(x).
Thus, clearly also ✷U,kπ(x). If now ¬π(x), then also ✷U,k¬π(x), whence ✷U,k⊥. This
contradicts the reflexivity, whence π(x). As x was arbitrary we get ∀x (✷U,nπ(x) →
π(x)). ⊣
We note that this lemma also holds for the other notions of restricted provability we
introduced in this subsection.
3 Formalized interpretability
As we already mentioned, our notion of interpretability is the one studied by Tarski et al
in [17]. In that notion, any axiom needs to be provable after translation. Under some fairly
weak conditions this implies that also theorems are translated to theorems. However, in
the domain of bounded arithmetics we do not generally have this. In the realm of for-
malized interpretation therefore, there has been a tendency to consider a small adaptation
of the original notion Tarski. This adaptation as introduced by Visser is called smooth
interpretability. In this subsection we shall exactly define this notion and see how it relates
to other notions of formalized interpretability. In various ways, one can hold that theo-
rems interpretability as discussed below is actually the more natural formalized version of
interpretability.
The theories that we study in this paper are theories formulated in first order predicate
logic. All theories have a finite signature that contains identity. For simplicity we shall
assume that all our theories are formulated in a purely relational way. Here is the formal
definition of a relative interpretation.
Definition 3.1. A translation k of the language of a theory S into the language of a theory
T is a pair 〈δ, F 〉 for which the following holds.
The first component δ, is called the domain specifier and is a formula in the language
of T with a single free variable. This formula is used to specify the domain of our inter-
pretation.
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The second component, F , is a finite map that sends relation symbols R (including
identity) from the language of S, to formulas F (R) in the language of T . We demand for
all R that the number of free variables of F (R) equals the arity of R.2 Recursively we
define the translation ϕk of a formula ϕ in the language of S as follows.
• (R(~x))k = F (R)(~x);
• (ϕ ∧ ψ)k = ϕk ∧ ψk and likewise for other boolean connectives;
(in particular, this implies ⊥k = ⊥);
• (∀x ϕ(x))k = ∀x (δ(x)→ ϕk) and analogously for the existential quantifier.
A relative interpretation k of a theory S into a theory T is a translation 〈δ, F 〉 so that
T ⊢ ϕk for all axioms ϕ of S.
To formalize insights about interpretability in weak meta-theories like S12 we need to
be very careful. Definitions of interpretability that are unproblematically equivalent in a
strong theory like, say, IΣ1 diverge in weak theories. As we shall see, the major source of
problems is the absence of BΣ1.
In this subsection, we study various divergent definitions of interpretability. We start
by making an elementary observation on interpretations. Basically, the next definition and
lemma say that translations transform proofs into translated proofs.
Definition 3.2. Let k be a translation. By recursion on a proof p in natural deduction
we define the translation of p under k, we write pk. For this purpose, we first define k(ϕ)
for formulae ϕ to be3
∧
xi∈FV(ϕ)
δ(xi) → ϕ
k. Here FV(ϕ) denotes the set of free variables
of ϕ. Clearly, this set cannot contain more than |ϕ| elements, whence k(ϕ) will not be too
big. Obviously, for sentences ϕ, we have k(ϕ) = ϕk.
If p is just a single assumption ϕ, then pk is k(ϕ). The translation of the proof con-
structions are defined precisely in such a way that we can prove Lemma 3.3 below. For
example, the translation of
ϕ ψ
ϕ ∧ ψ
will be
[
∧
xi∈FV(ϕ∧ψ)
δ(xi)]1∧
xi∈FV(ϕ)
δ(xi)
∧
xi∈FV(ϕ)
δ(xi)→ ϕk
ϕk
D
ψk
ϕk ∧ ψk∧
xi∈FV(ϕ∧ψ)
δ(xi)→ ϕ
k ∧ ψk
→ I, 1
2Formally, we should be more precise and specify our variables.
3To be really precise we should say that, for example, we let smaller xi come first in
∧
xi∈FV(ϕ)
δ(xi).
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. . .
pmp1
t1
k . . . tm
k
uk
t1
k . . . tm
k
k j
a T -proof an S-proof
(uk)
j
AxiomU (u)
u
Figure 1: Transitivity of interpretability
where D is just a symmetric copy of the part above ϕk. We note that the translation of the
proof constructions is available4 in S1
2
, as the number of free variables in ϕ∧ψ is bounded
by |ϕ ∧ ψ|.
Lemma 3.3. If p is a proof of a sentence ϕ with assumptions in some set of sentences Γ,
then for any translation k, pk is a proof of ϕk with assumptions in Γk.
Proof. Note that the restriction on sentences is needed. For example
∀x ϕ(x) ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ψ(x))
ψ(x)
but
(∀x ϕ(x))k (∀x (ϕ(x)→ ψ(x)))k
δ(x)→ ψk(x)
and in general 0 (δ(x) → ψk)↔ ψk. The lemma is proved by induction on p. To account
for formulas in the induction, we use the notion k(ϕ) from Definition 3.2, which is tailored
precisely to let the induction go through. ⊣
Remark 3.4. The proof translation leaves all the structure invariant. Thus, there is a
provably total (in S1
2
) function f such that, if p is a U, n-proof of ϕ, then pk is a proof of
ϕk, where pk has the following properties. All axioms in pk are ≤ f(n, k) and all formulas
ψ in pk have ρ(ψ) ≤ f(n, k).
4More efficient translations on proofs are also available. However they are less uniform.
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There are various reasons to give, why we want the notion of interpretability to be
provably transitive, that is, provably S✄U whenever both S✄T and T✄U . The obvious way
of proving this would be by composing (doing the one after the other) two interpretations.
Thus, if we have j : S ✄ T and k : T ✄ U we would like to have j ◦ k : S ✄ U where j ◦ k
denotes a natural composition of translations.
If we try to perform a proof as depicted in Figure 1, at a certain point we would like
to collect the S-proofs p1, · · · , pm of the j-translated T -axioms used in a proof of a k-
translation of an axiom u of U , and take the maximum of all such proofs. But to see that
such a maximum exists, we precisely need Σ1-collection.
However, it is desirable to also reason about interpretability in the absence of BΣ1. A
trick is needed to circumvent the problem of the unprovability of transitivity (and many
other elementary desiderata).
One way to solve the problem is by switching to a notion of interpretability where the
needed collection has been built in. This is the notion of smooth (axioms) interpretability
as in Definition 3.5. In this paper we shall mean by interpretability, unless mentioned
otherwise, always smooth interpretability. In the presence of BΣ1 this notion will coincide
with the earlier defined notion of interpretability, as Theorem 3.6 tells us.
Definition 3.5. We define the notions of axioms interpretability ✄a, theorems inter-
pretability ✄t, smooth axioms interpretability ✄sa and smooth theorems interpretability
✄st.
j : U ✄a V := ∀v ∃p (AxiomV (v)→ ProofU (p, v
j))
j : U ✄t V := ∀ϕ∀p ∃p
′ (ProofV (p, ϕ)→ ProofU (p
′, ϕj))
j : U ✄sa V := ∀x∃y ∀ v≤x∃ p≤y (AxiomV (v)→ ProofU (p, v
j))
j : U ✄st V := ∀x∃y ∀ϕ≤x∀ p≤x∃ p
′≤y (ProofV (p, ϕ)→ ProofU (p
′, ϕj))
It is now easy to see that ✄a is indeed provably transitive over very weak base theories.
For ✄t this follows almost directly from the definition.
Theorem 3.6. In S1
2
we have all the arrows as depicted in Figure 2.
Proof. We shall only comment on the arrows that are not completely trivial.
• T ⊢ j : U ✄a V → j : U ✄sa V , if T ⊢ BΣ1. So, reason in T and suppose
∀v ∃p (AxiomV (v)→ ProofU (p, v
j)). If we fix some x, we get
∀ v≤x∃p (AxiomV (v)→ ProofU (p, v
j)). By BΣ1 we get the required
∃y ∀ v≤x∃ p≤y (AxiomV (v) → ProofU (v
j)). It is not clear if T ⊢ BΣ−1 , parameter-free
collection, is a necessary condition.
• S1
2
6⊢ j : U ✄a V → j : U ✄t V . A counter-example is given in [18].
11
j : U ✄sa V
j : U ✄t V
j : U ✄a V
j : U ✄st V
exp
BΣ1
In S12:
Figure 2: Versions of relative interpretability. The dotted arrows indicate that an additional
condition is needed in our proof; the condition written next to it. The arrow with a cross
through it, indicates that we know that the implication fails in S1
2
.
• T ⊢ j : U✄tV → j : U✄saV , if T ⊢ exp. If V is reflexive, we get by Corollary 6.9 that
⊢ U ✄t V ↔ U ✄sa V . However, different interpretations are used to witness the different
notions of interpretability in this case. If T ⊢ exp, we reason as follows. We reason in T
and suppose that ∀ϕ∀p ∃p′ (ProofV (p, ϕ)→ ProofU (p
′, ϕj)). We wish to see
∀x∃y ∀ v≤x∃ p≤y (AxiomV (v)→ ProofU (v
j)). (1)
So, we pick x arbitrarily and consider5 ν :=
∧
AxiomV (vi)∧vi≤x
vi. Notice that in the
worst case, for all y ≤ x, we have AxiomV (y), whence the length of ν can be bounded by
x · |x|. Thus, ν itself can be bounded by xx, which exists whenever T ⊢ exp. Clearly,
∃p ProofV (p, ν) whence by our assumption ∃p
′ ProofU (p
′, νj). In a uniform way, with just
a slightly larger proof p′′, every vi
j can be extracted from the proof p′ of νj. We may take
this p′′ ≈ y to obtain (1). Note that T ⊢ exp is not a necessary condition since ✄t implies
✄a and if we have BΣ1 the latter implies ✄sa.
• S1
2
⊢ j : U ✄sa V → j : U ✄st V . So, we wish to see that
∀x∃y ∀ϕ≤x∀ p≤x∃ p′≤y (ProofV (p, ϕ)→ ProofU (p
′, ϕj))
from the assumption that j : U ✄sa V . So, we pick x arbitrarily. If now for some p ≤ x we
have ProofV (p, ϕ), then clearly ϕ ≤ x and all axioms vi of V that occur in p are ≤ x. By
our assumption j : U ✄sa V , we can find a y0 such that we can find proofs pi ≤ y0 for all
5To see that ν exists, we seem to also use some collection; we collect all the vi ≤ x for which AxiomV (vi).
However, it is not hard to see that we can consider ν also without collection since we use a natural coding.
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the vi
j . Now, with some sloppy notation, let pj[vji /pi] denote the j-translation of p where
each j-translated axiom vji is replaced by pi.
Clearly, pj[vji /pi] is a proof for ϕ
j . The size of this proof can be estimated (again with
sloppy notations):
pj[vji /pi] ≤ p
j[vji /y0] ≤ (p
j)|y0| ≤ (xj)|y0|.
The latter bound is clearly present in S1
2
. ⊣
We note that we have many admissible rules from one notion of interpretability to
another. For example, by Buss’s theorem on the provably total recursive functions of S1
2
,
it is not hard to see that
S12 ⊢ j : U ✄a V ⇒ S
1
2 ⊢ j : U ✄t V.
In the rest of this paper, we shall at most places no longer write subscripts to the ✄’s.
Our reading convention is then that we take that notion of interpretability that is best to
perform the argument. Often this is just smooth interpretability ✄s, which from now on
is the notation for ✄sa.
Moreover, in [18] some sort of conservation result concerning ✄a and ✄s is proved. For
a considerable class of formulas ϕ and theories T , and for a considerable class of arguments
we have that T ⊢ ϕa ⇒ T ⊢ ϕs. Here ϕa denotes the formula ϕ using the notion ✄a
and likewise for ϕs. Thus indeed, in many cases a sharp distinction between the notions
involved is not needed.
We could also consider the following notion of interpretability.
j : U ✄st1 V := ∀x∃y ∀ϕ≤x∃ p
′≤y (✷V ϕ→ ProofU (p
′, ϕj))
Clearly, j : U ✄st1 V → U ✄st V . However, for the reverse implication one seems to
need BΠ−1 . Also, a straightforward proof of U ⊢ id : U ✄st1 U seems to need BΠ
−
1 .
Thus, the notion ✄st1 seems to say more on the nature of a theory than on the nature of
interpretability.
4 Cuts and induction
Inductive reasoning is a central feature of everyday mathematical practice. We are so used
to it, that it enters a proof almost unnoticed. It is when one works with weak theories and
in the absence of sufficient induction, that its all pervading nature is best felt.
A main tool to compensate for the lack of induction are the so-called definable cuts.
They are definable initial segments of the natural numbers of a possibly non-standard
model that possess some desirable properties that we could not infer for all numbers to
hold by means of induction.
The idea is really simple. So, if we can derive ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ 1)) and do not
have access to an induction axiom for ϕ, we just consider J(x) : ∀ y≤x ϕ(y). Clearly J
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now defines an initial segment on which ϕ holds. As we shall see, for a lot of reasoning we
can restrict ourselves to initial segments rather than quantifying over all numbers.
4.1 Basic properties of cuts
Throughout the literature one can find some variations on the definition of a cut. At some
places, a cut is only supposed to be an initial segment of the natural numbers. At other
places some additional closure properties are demanded. By a well known technique due to
Solovay (see for example [6]) any definable initial segment can be shortened in a definable
way, so that it has a lot of desirable closure properties. Therefore, and as we almost always
need the closure properties, we include them in our definition.
Definition 4.1. A definable U -cut is a formula J(x) with only x free, for which we have
the following.
1. U ⊢ J(0) ∧ ∀x (J(x)→ J(x+ 1))
2. U ⊢ J(x) ∧ y≤x→ J(y)
3. U ⊢ J(x) ∧ J(y)→ J(x+ y) ∧ J(x · y)
4. U ⊢ J(x)→ J(ω1(x))
We shall sometimes also write x ∈ J instead of J(x). A first fundamental insight about
cuts is the principle of outside big, inside small. Although not every number x is in J , we
can find for every x a proof px that witnesses x ∈ J .
Lemma 4.2. Let T and U be reasonable arithmetical theories and let J be a U -cut. We
have that
T ⊢ ∀x ✷UJ(x).
Actually, we can have the quantifier over all cuts within the theory T , that is
T ⊢ ∀U-CutJ ∀x ✷UJ(x).
Proof. Let us start by making the quantifier ∀U-CutJ a bit more precise. By ∀U-CutJ we
shall mean ∀J (✷UCut(J) → . . .). Here Cut(J) is the definable function that sends the
code of a formula χ with one free variable to the code of the formula that expresses that
χ defines a cut.
For a number a, we start with the standard proof of J(0). This proof is combined with
a−1 many instantiations of the standard proof of ∀x (J(x) → J(x + 1)). In the case of
weaker theories, we have to switch to efficient numerals to keep the bound of the proof
within range. ⊣
Remark 4.3. The proof sketch actually tells us that (provably in S1
2
) for every U -cut J ,
there is an n ∈ ω such that ∀x ✷U,nJ(x).
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Lemma 4.4. Cuts are provably closed under terms, that is
T ⊢ ∀U-CutJ ∀Termt ✷U∀ ~x∈J t(~x) ∈ J.
Proof. By an easy induction on terms, fixing some U -cut J . Prima facie this looks like a
Σ1-induction but it is easy to see that the proofs have poly-time (in t) bounds, whence the
induction is ∆0(ω1). ⊣
As all U -cuts are closed under ω1(x) and the smash function ♯, simply relativizing all
quantors to a cut is an example of an interpretation of S1
2
in U . We shall always denote
both the cut and the interpretation that it defines by the same letter.
4.2 Cuts and the Henkin construction
It is well known that we can perform the Henkin construction in a rather weak meta-
theory. As the Henkin model has a uniform description, we can link it to interpretations.
The following theorem makes this precise.
Theorem 4.5. If U ⊢ Con(V ), then U ✄ V .
Early treatments of this theorem were given in [20] and [7]. A first fully formalized
version was given in [2]. A proof of Theorem 4.5 would closely follow the Henkin construc-
tion.
Thus, first the language of V is extended so that it contains a witness c∃xϕ(x) for every
existential sentence ∃x ϕ(x). Then we can extend V to a maximal consistent V ′ in the
enriched language, containing all sentences of the form ∃xϕ(x) → ϕ(c∃xϕ(x)). This V
′
can be seen as a term model with a corresponding truth predicate. Clearly, if V ⊢ ϕ
then ϕ ∈ V ′. It is not hard to see that V ′ is representable (close inspection yields a
∆2-representation) in U .
At first sight the argument uses quite some induction in extending V to V ′. Miracu-
lously enough, the whole argument can be adapted to S1
2
. The trick consists in replacing
the use of induction by employing definable cuts as is explained above. We get the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.6. For any numberizable theories U and V , we have that
S12 ⊢ ✷UCon(V )→ ∃k (k : U ✄ V & ∀ϕ ✷U (✷V ϕ→ ϕ
k)).
Proof. A proof can be found in [18]. Actually something stronger is proved there. Namely,
that for some standard number m we have
∀ϕ∃ p≤ωm1 (ϕ) ProofU (p,✷V ϕ→ ϕ
k).
⊣
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As cuts have nice closure properties, many arguments can be performed within that
cut. The numbers in the cut will, so to say, play the role of the normal numbers. It turns
out that the whole Henkin argument can be carried out using only the consistency on a
cut.
We shall write ✷JTϕ for ∃ p∈J ProofT (p, ϕ). Thus, it is also clear what ✸
J
Tϕ and
ConJ(V ) mean.
Theorem 4.7. We have Theorem 4.6 also in the following form.
T ⊢ ∀U-CutI
[
✷UCon
I(V )→ ∃k (k : U ✄ V & ∀ϕ ✷U (✷V ϕ→ ϕ
k))
]
Proof. By close inspection of the proof of Theorem 4.6. All operations on hypothetical
proofs p can be bounded by some ωk1(p), for some standard k. As I is closed under ω1(x),
all the bounds remain within I. ⊣
We conclude this subsection with two asides, closely related to the Henkin construction.
Lemma 4.8. Let U contain S1
2
. We have that U ⊢ Con(Pred). Here, Con(Pred) is a natural
formalization of the statement that predicate logic is consistent.
Proof. By defining a simple (one-point) model within S1
2
. ⊣
Remark 4.9. If U proves L∆02, then it holds that U ✄ V iff V is interpretable in U by
some interpretation that maps identity to identity.
Proof. Suppose j : U ✄ V with j = 〈δ, F 〉. We can define j′ := 〈δ′, F ′〉 with δ′(x) :=
δ(x)∧∀ y<x (δ(y)→ y 6=jx). F ′ agrees with F on all symbols except that it maps identity
to identity. By the minimal number principle we can prove ∀x (δ(x)→ ∃x′ (x′=jx)∧δ′(x)),
and thus ∀~x (δ′(~x)→ (ϕj(~x)↔ ϕj
′
(~x))) for all formulae ϕ. ⊣
5 Pudla´k’s lemma
In this section we will state and prove what is known as Pudla´k’s lemma. Moreover, we
shall prove a very useful consequence of this lemma. Roughly speaking, Pudla´k’s lemma
tells us how interpretations bear on the models that they induce. Therefor, let us first see
how interpretations and models are related.
5.1 Interpretations and models
We can view interpretations j : U ✄ V as a way of defining uniformly a model N of V
inside a model M of U . Interpretations in foundational papers mostly bear the guise of a
uniform model construction.
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Definition 5.1. Let j : U ✄V with j = 〈δ, F 〉. IfM |= U , we denote by Mj the following
model.
• |Mj | = {x ∈ |M| | M |= δ(x)}/ ≡, where a ≡ b iff M |= a =j b.
• Mj |= R(α1, . . . , αn) iff M |= F (R)(a1, . . . , an), for some a1 ∈ α1, . . . , an ∈ αn.
The fact that j : U ✄ V is now reflected in the observation that, whenever M |= U , then
Mj |= V .
On many occasions viewing interpretations as uniform model constructions provides
the right heuristics.
5.2 Pudla´k’s isomorphic cut
Pudla´k’s lemma is central to many arguments in the field of interpretability logics. It
provides a means to compare a model M of U and its internally defined model Mj of V
if j : U ✄ V . If U has full induction, this comparison is fairly easy.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose j : U ✄ V and U has full induction. Let M be a model of U . We
have that Mend M
j via a definable embedding.
Proof. If U has full induction and j : U ✄ V , we may by Remark 4.9 actually assume that
j maps identity in V to identity in U . Thus, we can define the following function.
f :=
{
0 7→ 0j
x+ 1 7→ f(x)+j1j
Now, by induction, f can be proved to be total. Note that full induction is needed here,
as we have a-priori no bound on the complexity of 0j and +j . Moreover, it can be proved
that f(a + b) = f(a)+jf(b), f(a · b) = f(a) ·jf(b) and that y≤jf(b) → ∃ a<b f(a) = y.
In other words, that f is an isomorphism between its domain and its co-domain and the
co-domain is an initial segment of Mj. ⊣
If U does not have full induction, a comparison betweenM andMj is given by Pudla´k’s
lemma, first explicitly mentioned in [15]. Roughly, Pudla´k’s lemma says that in the general
case, we can find a definable U -cut I of M and a definable embedding f : I −→Mj such
that f [I] end M
j .
In formulating the statement we have to be careful as we can no longer assume that
identity is mapped to identity. A precise formulation of Pudla´k’s lemma in terms of an
isomorphism between two initial segments can for example be found in [10]. We have
chosen here to formulate and prove the most general syntactic consequence of Pudla´k’s
lemma, namely that I and f [I], as substructures ofM andMj respectively, make true the
same ∆0-formulas.
In the proof of Pudla´k’s lemma we shall make the quantifier ∃j,J-functionh explicit. It
basically means that h defines a function from a cut J to the =j-equivalence classes of the
numbers defined by the interpretation j.
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Lemma 5.3 (Pudla´k’s Lemma).
S12 ⊢ j : U ✄ V → ∃
U-CutJ ∃j,J-functionh∀∆0ϕ ✷U∀ ~x ∈ J (ϕ
j(h(~x))↔ ϕ(~x))
Moreover, the h and J can be obtained uniformly from j by a function that is provably total
in S1
2
.
Proof. Again, by ∃U-CutJ ψ we shall mean ∃J (✷UCut(J)∧ψ), where Cut(J) is the definable
function that sends the code of a formula χ to the code of a formula that expresses that
χ defines a cut. We apply a similar strategy for quantifying over j, J-functions. Given a
translation j, the defining property for a relation H to be a j, J-function is
∀ ~x, y, y′∈J (H(~x, y) & H(~x, y′)→ y=jy′).
We will often consider H as a function h and write for example ψ(h(~x)) instead of
∀y (H(~x, y)→ ψ(y)).
The idea of the proof is very easy. Just map the numbers of U via h to the numbers of
V so that 0 goes to 0j and the mapping commutes with the successor relation. If we want
to prove a property of this mapping, we might run into problems as the intuitive proof
appeals to induction. And sufficient induction is precisely what we lack in weaker theories.
The way out here is to just put all the properties that we need our function h to
possess into its definition. Of course, then the work is in checking that we still have a good
definition. Being good means here that the set of numbers on which h is defined induces
a definable U -cut.
In a sense, we want an (definable) initial part of the numbers of U to be isomorphic
under h to an initial part of the numbers of V . Thus, h should definitely commute with
successor, addition and multiplication. Moreover, the image of h should define an initial
segment, that is, be closed under the smaller than relation. All these requirements are re-
flected in the definition of Goodsequence. Let δ denote the domain specifier of the translatio
j. We define
Goodsequence(σ, x, y) := lh(σ) = x+ 1 ∧ σ0=
j0j ∧ σx=
jy
∧ ∀ i≤x δ(σi)
∧ ∀ i<x (σi+1=
jσi+
j1j)
∧ ∀ k+l≤x (σk+
jσl=
jσk+l)
∧ ∀ k·l≤x (σk·
jσl=
jσk·l)
∧ ∀a (a≤jy → ∃ i≤x σi=
ja).
Subsequently, we define
H(x, y) := ∃σ Goodsequence(σ, x, y)
∧ ∀σ′ ∀y′ (Goodsequence(σ′, x, y′)→ y=jy′),
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and
J ′(x) := ∀x′≤x∃y H(x′, y).
Finally, we define J to be the closure of J ′ under +, · and ω1(x). Now that we have defined
all the machinery we can start the real proof. The reader is encouraged to see at what
place which defining property is used in the proof.
We first note that J ′(x) indeed defines a U -cut. For ✷UJ
′(0) you basically need se-
quentiality of U , and the translations of the identity axioms and properties of 0.
To see ✷U∀x (J
′(x) → J ′(x + 1)) is also not hard. It follows from the translation of
basic properties provable in V , like x = y → x+ 1 = y + 1 and x+ (y + 1) = (x+ y) + 1,
etc. The other properties of Definition 4.1 go similarly.
We should now see that h is a j, J-function. This is quite easy, as we have all the
necessary conditions present in our definition. Actually, we have
✷U∀x, y∈J (h(x)=
jh(y)↔ x = y) (2)
The← direction reflects that h is a j, J-function. The→ direction follows from elementary
reasoning in U using the translation of basic arithmetical facts provable in V . So, if x 6= y,
say x < y, then x+ (z + 1) = y whence h(x)+jh(z + 1)=jh(y) which implies h(x)6=jh(y).
We are now to see that for our U -cut J and for our j, J-function h we indeed have that6
∀∆0ϕ ✷U∀ ~x∈J (ϕ
j(h(~x))↔ ϕ(~x)).
First we shall proof this using a seemingly Σ1-induction. A closer inspection of the proof
shall show that we can provide at all places sufficiently small bounds, so that actually an
ω1(x)-induction suffices. We first proof the following claim.
Claim 1. ∀Termt ✷U∀ ~x, y ∈ J (t
j(h(~x))=jh(y)↔ t(~x) = y)
Proof. The proof is by induction on t. The basis is trivial. To see for example
✷U∀ y∈J (0
j=jh(y)↔ 0 = y)
we reason in U as follows. By the definition of h, we have that h(0)=j0j , and by (2) we
moreover see that 0j=jh(y) ↔ 0 = y. The other base case, that is, when t is an atom, is
precisely (2).
For the induction step, we shall only do +, as · goes almost completely the same. Thus,
we assume that t(~x) = t1(~x) + t2(~x) and set out to prove
✷U∀ ~x, y∈J (t1
j(h(~x))+jt2
j(h(~x))=jh(y)↔ t1(~x) + t2(~x) = y).
Within U :
6We use h(~x) as short for h(x0), · · · , h(xn).
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← If t1(~x) + t2(~x) = y, then by Lemma 4.4, we can find y1 and y2 with t1(~x) =
y1 and t2(~x) = y2. The induction hypothesis tells us that t1
j(h(~x))=jh(y1) and
t2
j(h(~x))=jh(y2). Now by (2), h(y1 + y2)=
jh(y) and by the definition of h we get
that
h(y1 + y2) =
j h(y1)+
jh(y2)
=j i.h. t1
j(h(~x))+jt2
j(h(~x))
=j (t1(h(~x)) + t2(h(~x)))
j.
→ Suppose now t1
j(h(~x))+jt2
j(h(~x))=jh(y). Then clearly t1
j(h(~x))≤jh(y) whence by
the definition of h we can find some y1 ≤ y such that t1
j(h(~x))=j h(y1) and likewise for
t2 (using the translation of the commutativity of addition). The induction hypothesis
now yields t1(~x) = y1 and t2(~x) = y2. By the definition of h, we get
h(y)=jh(y1)+
jh(y2)=
jh(y1+y2), whence by (2), y1+y2 = y, that is, t1(~x)+t2(~x) = y.
⊣
We now prove by induction on ϕ ∈ ∆0 that
✷U∀ ~x∈J (ϕ
j(h(~x))↔ ϕ(~x)). (3)
For the base case, we consider that ϕ ≡ t1(~x) + t2(~x). We can now use Lemma 4.4 to
note that
✷U∀ ~x∈J (t1(~x) = t2(~x)↔ ∃ y∈J (t1(~x) = y ∧ t2(~x) = y))
and then use Claim 1, the transitivity of = and its translation to obtain the result.
The boolean connectives are really trivial, so we only need to consider bounded quan-
tification. We show (still within U) that
∀ y, ~z∈J (∀x≤jh(y) ϕj(x, h(~z))↔ ∀x≤y ϕ(x, ~z)).
← Assume ∀x≤y ϕ(x, ~z) for some y, ~z ∈ J . We are to show
∀x≤jh(y) ϕj(x, h(~z)). Now, pick some x≤jh(y) (the translation of the universal quantifier
actually gives us an additional δ(x) which we shall omit for the sake of readability). Now by
the definition of h we find some y′ ≤ y such that h(y′) = x. As y′ ≤ y, by our assumption,
ϕ(y′, ~z) whence by the induction hypothesis ϕj(h(y′), h(~z)), that is ϕj(x, h(~z)). As x was
arbitrarily ≤jh(y), we are done.
→ Suppose ∀x≤jh(y) ϕj(x, h(~z)). We are to see that ∀x≤y ϕ(x, ~z)). So, pick x ≤ y
arbitrarily. Clearly h(x)≤jh(y), whence, by our assumption
ϕj(h(x), h(~z)) and by the induction hypothesis, ϕ(x, ~z).
Note that in our proof we have used twice a Σ1-induction; In Claim 1 and in proving
(3). Let us now see that we can dispense with the Σ1 induction.
In both cases, at every induction step, a constant piece p′ of proof is added to the
total proof. This piece looks every time the same. Only some parameters in it have to
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be replaced by subterms of t. So, the addition to the total proof can be estimated by
p′a(t) which is about O(t
k) for some standard k and indeed, our induction was really but a
bounded one. Both our inductions went over syntax and whence are available in S1
2
.
Note that in proving (3) we dealt with the bounded quantification by appealing to the
induction hypothesis only once, followed by a generalization. So, fortunately we did not
need to apply the induction hypothesis to all x≤y, which would have yielded an exponential
blow-up. ⊣
Remark 5.4. Pudla´k’s lemma is valid already if we employ the notion of theorems inter-
pretability rather than smooth interpretability. If we work with theories in the language
of arithmetic, we can do even better. In this case, axioms interpretability can suffice. In
order to get this, all arithmetical facts whose translations were used in the proof of Lemma
5.3 have to be promoted to the status of axiom. However, a close inspection of the proof
shows that these facts are very basic and that there are not so many of them.
If j is an interpretation with j : α ✄ β, we shall sometimes call the corresponding
isomorphic cut that is given by Lemma 5.3, the Pudla´k cut of j and denote it by the
corresponding upper case letter J .
5.3 A consequence of Pudla´k’s Lemma
The following consequence of Pudla´k’s Lemma is simple, yet can be very useful. For sim-
plicity we state the consequence for sentential extensions of some base theory T extending
S1
2
. Thus, α✄ β will be short for (T + α)✄ (T + β).
Lemma 5.5. (In S1
2
:) If j : α✄ β then, for every T + β cut I there exists a T + α cut J
such that for every γ we have that
j : α ∧ ✷Jγ ✄ β ∧ ✷Iγ.
Proof. By a minor adaptation of the standard argument. First, we define Goodsequence.
Goodsequence(σ, x, y) := lh(σ) = x+ 1 ∧ σ0=
j0j ∧ σx=
jy
∧ ∀ i<x (σi+1=
jσi+
j1j)
∧ ∀ k+l≤x (σk+
jσl=
jσk+l)
∧ ∀ k·l≤x (σk·
jσl=
jσk·l)
∧ ∀a (a≤jy → ∃ i≤x σi=
ja)
∧ ∀ i<x Ij(σi)
Next, we define
H(x, y) := ∃σ Goodsequence(σ, x, y)
∧ ∀σ′ ∀y′ (Goodsequence(σ′, x, y′)→ y=jy′),
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and
J ′(x) := ∀x′≤x∃y H(x′, y).
Finally, we define J to be the closure of J ′ under +, · and ω1(x).
As before, one can see H(x, y) as defining a function (modulo =j), call it h, that defines
an isomorphism between J and the image of J . Moreover, in the definition of Goodsequence
we demanded that the image of h is a subset of I in the clause ∀ i<x Ij(σi).
It is easy to see that J ′ is closed under successor, that is, J ′(x) → J ′(x + 1). We
only comment on the new ingredient of the image of h being a subset of I. However,
T + β ⊢ I(x) → I(x + 1), as I is a definable cut. As j : T + α ✄ T + β, clearly T + α ⊢
Ij(x)→ Ij(x+j 1j) and indeed J ′ is closed under successor.
⊣
In the literature, Lemma 5.5 was known only for I to be the trivial cut of all numbers
defined by x = x.
6 The Orey-Ha´jek characterizations
This final section contains the most substantial part of the paper. We consider the diagram
from Figure 3. It is well known that all the implications hold when both U and V are
reflexive. This fact is referred to as the Orey-Ha´jek characterizations ([2], [14], [4], [5]) for
interpretability. However, for the Π1-conservativity part, we should also mention work by
Guaspari, Lindstro¨m and Pudla´k ([3], [12], [13], [15]).
In this section we shall comment on all the implications in Figure 3, and study the
conditions on U , V and the meta-theory, that are necessary or sufficient.
Lemma 6.1. In S1
2
we can prove ∀n ✷UConn(V )→ U ✄ V .
Proof. The only requirement for this implication to hold, is that U ⊢ Con(Pred). But, by
our assumptions on U and by Lemma 4.8 this is automatically satisfied.
Let us first give the informal proof. Thus, let AxiomV (x) be the formula that defines
the axiom set of V .
We now apply a trick due to Feferman and consider the theory V ′ that consists of those
axioms of V up to which we have evidence for their consistency. Thus, AxiomV ′(x) :=
AxiomV (x) ∧ Conx(V ).
We shall now prove that U ✄ V in two steps. First, we will see that
U ⊢ Con(V ′). (4)
Thus, by Theorem 4.5 we get that U ✄ V ′. Second, we shall see that
V = V ′. (5)
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U ✄ V
∀∀Π
b
1pi (✷V pi → ✷Upi)
∀n U ⊢ Conn(V )6.1
6.2
6.36.5 6.46.6
Figure 3: Characterizations of interpretability. The labels at the arrows are references to
where in the paper this arrow is proven and what the conditions are for the arrow to hold.
Moreover, we will discuss which conditions should hold for the base theory so that the
implications become formalizable.
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To see (4), we reason in U , and assume for a contradiction that ProofV ′(p,⊥) for some
proof p. We consider the largest axiom v that occurs in p. By assumption we have (in
U) that AxiomV ′(v) whence Conv(V ). But, as clearly V
′ ⊆ V , we see that p is also a
V -proof. We can now obtain a cut-free proof p′ of ⊥. Clearly ProofV,v(p
′,⊥) and we have
our contradiction.
If V ′ is empty, we cannot consider v. But in this case, Con(V ′) ↔ Con(Pred), and by
assumption, U ⊢ Con(Pred).
We shall now see (5). Clearly N |= AxiomV ′(v) → AxiomV (v) for any v ∈ N. To see
that the converse also holds, we reason as follows.
Suppose N |= AxiomV (v). By assumption U ⊢ Conv(V ), whence Conv(V ) holds on any
modelM of U . We now observe that N is an initial segment of (the numbers of) any model
M of U , that is,
N end M. (6)
As M |= Conv(V ) and as Conv(V ) is a Π1-sentence, we see that also N |= Conv(V ). By
assumption we had N |= AxiomV (v), thus we get that N |= AxiomV ′(v). We conclude that
N |= AxiomV (x)↔ AxiomV ′(x) (7)
whence, that V = V ′. As U ⊢ Con(V ′), we get by Theorem 4.5 that U ✄ V ′. We may thus
infer the required U ✄ V .
It is not possible to directly formalize the informal proof. At (7) we concluded that
V = V ′. This actually uses some form of Π1-reflection which is manifested in (6). The lack
of reflection in the formal environment will be compensated by another sort of reflection,
as formulated in Theorem 4.6.
Moreover, to see (4), we had to use a cut elimination. To avoid this, we shall need a
sharper version of Feferman’s trick.
Let us now start with the formal proof sketch and refer to [18] for more details. We
shall reason in U . Without any induction we conclude ∀x (Conx(V ) → Conx+1(V )) or
∃x (Conx(V ) ∧✷V,x+1⊥). In both cases we shall sketch a Henkin construction.
If ∀x (Conx(V )→ Conx+1(V )) and also Con0(V ), we can find a cut J(x) with J(x)→
Conx(V ). We now consider the following non-standard proof predicate.
✷
∗
Wϕ := ∃x∈J ✷W,xϕ
We note that we have Con∗(V ), where Con∗(V ) of course denotes ¬(∃x∈J ✷V,x⊥). As
always, we extend the language on J by adding witnesses and define a series of theories in
the usual way. That is, by adding more and more sentences (in J) to our theories while
staying consistent (in our non-standard sense).
V = V0 ⊆ V1 ⊆ V2 ⊆ · · ·with Con
∗(Vi) (8)
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We note that ✷∗Viϕ and ✷
∗
Vi
¬ϕ is not possible, and that for ϕ ∈ J we can not have
Con∗(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ). These observations seem to be too trivial to make, but actually many a
non-standard proof predicate encountered in the literature does prove the consistency of
inconsistent theories.
As always, the sequence (8) defines a cut I ⊆ J , that induces a Henkin set W and we
can relate our required interpretation k to this Henkin set as was, for example, done in
[18].
We now consider the case that for some fixed b we have Conb(V ) ∧ ✷V,b+1⊥. We note
that we can see the uniqueness of this b without using any substantial induction. Basically,
we shall now do the same construction as before only that we now possibly stop at b.
For example the cut J(x) will now be replaced by x ≤ b. Thus, we may end up with a
truncated Henkin set W . But this set is complete with respect to relatively small formulas.
Moreover, W is certainly closed under subformulas and substitution of witnesses. Thus,
W is sufficiently large to define the required interpretation k.
In both cases we can perform the following reasoning.
✷V ϕ → ∃x ✷V,xϕ
→ ∃x ✷U (Conx(V ) ∧ ✷V,xϕ)
→ ✷U✷
∗
V ϕ
→ ✷Uϕ
k by Theorem 4.6.
The remarks from [18] on the bounds of our proofs are still applicable and we thus obtain
a smooth interpretation. ⊣
Lemma 6.2. In the presence of exp, we can prove that for reflexive U , U✄V → ∀x ✷UConx(V ).
Proof. The informal argument is conceptually very clear and we have depicted it in Figure
4. The accompanying reasoning is as follows.
We assume U ✄ V , whence for some k we have k : U ✄ V . Thus, for axioms in-
terpretability we find that ∀u∃p (AxiomV (u) → ProofU (p, u
k)). We are now to see that
∀x U ⊢ Conx(V ). So, we fix some x. By our assumption we get that for some l, that
∀u≤x∃p (AxiomV (u)→ ProofU,l(p, u
k)). (9)
This formula is actually equivalent to the Σ1-formula
∃n ∀u≤x∃ p≤n (AxiomV (u)→ ProofU,l(p, u
k)) (10)
from which we may conclude by provable Σ1-completeness,
U ⊢ ∃n ∀u≤x∃ p≤n (AxiomV (u)→ ProofU,l(p, u
k)). (11)
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k . . . vm
k
⊥
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k . . . vm
k
⊥
u1 . . . ulm
In U :
. . .
⊥
v1 . . . vm
k
u1 . . . ul1
pmp1
Figure 4: Transformations on proofs
We now reason in U and suppose that there is some V, x-proof p of ⊥. The assumptions
in p are axioms v1 . . . vm of V , with each vi ≤ x. Moreover, all the formulas ψ in p have
ρ(ψ) ≤ x. By Lemma 3.3, this p transforms to a proof pk of ⊥k which is again ⊥.
The assumptions in pk are now among the v1
k . . . vm
k. By Remark 3.4 we get that for
some n′ depending on x and k, we have that all the axioms in pk are ≤ n′ and all the ψ
occurring in pk have ρ(ψ) ≤ n′.
Now by (11), we have U, l-proofs pi ≤ n of vi
k. The assumptions in the pi are axioms
of U . Clearly all of these axioms are ≤ l. We can now form a U, l+n′-proof p′ of ⊥ by
substituting all the pi for the (vi)
k. Thus we have shown ProofU,l+n′(p
′,⊥). But this clearly
contradicts the reflexivity of U .
The informal argument is readily formalized to obtain T ⊢ U ✄ V → ∀x ✷UCon(V, x).
However there are some subtleties.
First of all, to conclude that (9) is equivalent to (10), a genuine application of BΣ1
is needed. If U lacks BΣ1, we have to switch to smooth interpretability to still have the
implication valid. Smoothness then automatically also provides the l that we used in 9.
In addition we need that T proves the totality of exponentiation. For weaker theories,
we only have provable ∃Σb1-completeness. But if AxiomV (u) is ∆
b
1, we can only guarantee
that ∀u≤m ∃ p≤n (AxiomV (u)→ ProofU (p, u
k)) is Πb2. As far as we know, exponentiation
is needed to prove ∃Πb2-completeness.
All other transformations of objects in our proof only require the totality of ω1(x). ⊣
The assumption that U is reflexive can in a sense not be dispensed with. That is, if
∀V (U ✄ V → ∀x ✷UConx(V )), (12)
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then U is reflexive, as clearly U ✄ U . In a similar way we see that if
∀U (U ✄ V → ∀x ✷UConx(V )), (13)
then V is reflexive. However, V being reflexive could never be a sufficient condition for (13)
to hold, as we know from [16] that interpreting reflexive theories in finitely many axioms
is complete Σ3.
Lemma 6.3. In S1
2
we can prove ∀x ✷UConx(V )→ ∀
∀Πb1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ).
Proof. There are no conditions on U and V for this implication to hold. We shall directly
give the formal proof as the informal proof does not give a clearer picture.
Thus, we reason in S1
2
and assume ∀x ✷UConx(V ). Now we consider any π ∈ ∀Π
b
1 such
that ✷V π. Thus, for some x we have ✷V,xπ. We choose x large enough, so that we also
have (see Remark 2.3)
✷U (¬π → ✷V,x¬π). (14)
As ✷V,xπ → ✷U✷V,xπ, we also have that
✷U✷V,xπ. (15)
Combining (14), (15) and the assumption that ∀x ✷UConx(V ), we see that indeed ✷Uπ. ⊣
Lemma 6.4. In S1
2
we can prove that for reflexive V we have
∀∀Π
b
1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ)→ ∀x ✷UConx(V ).
Proof. If V is reflexive and ∀∀Π
b
1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ) then, as for every x, Conx(V ) is a ∀Π
b
1-
formula, also ∀x ✷UConx(V ). ⊣
It is obvious that
∀U [∀∀Π
b
1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ)→ ∀x ✷UConx(V )] (16)
implies that V is reflexive. Likewise,
∀V [∀∀Π
b
1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ)→ ∀x ✷UConx(V )] (17)
implies that U is reflexive. However, U being reflexive can never be a sufficient condition
for (17) to hold. An easy counterexample is obtained by taking U to be PRA and V to
be IΣ1 as it is well-known that IΣ1 is provably Π2 conservative over PRA and that IΣ1 is
finitely axiomatized.
Lemma 6.5. (In S1
2
:) For reflexive V we have ∀∀Π
b
1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ)→ U ✄ V .
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Proof. We know of no direct proof of this implication. Also, all proofs in the literature go
via Lemmata 6.4 and 6.1, and hence use reflexivity of V . ⊣
In our context, the reflexivity of V is not necessary, as ∀U U✄S1
2
and S1
2
is not reflexive.
Lemma 6.6. Let U be a reflexive and sequential theory. We have in S1
2
that U ✄ V →
∀∀Π
b
1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ).
If moreover U ⊢ exp we also get U ✄ V → ∀Π1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ). If U is not reflexive,
we still have that U ✄ V → ∃U-CutJ ∀Π1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ
J).
For these implications, it is actually sufficient to work with the notion of theorems
interpretability.
Proof. The intuition for the formal proof comes from Pudla´k’s lemma, which in turn is
tailored to compensate a lack of induction. We shall first give an informal proof sketch if
U has full induction. Then we shall give the formal proof using Pudla´k’s lemma.
If U has full induction and j : U ✄ V , we may assume by Remark 4.9 assume that j
maps identity to identity. Let M be an arbitrary model of U . By Theorem 5.2 we now see
that M end M
j . If for some π ∈ Π1, ✷V π then by soundness M
j |= π, whence M |= π.
As M was an arbitrary model of U , we get by the completeness theorem that ✷Uπ.
To transform this argument into a formal one, valid for weak theories, there are two
major adaptations to be made. First, the use of the soundness and completeness theorem
have to be avoided . This can be done by simply staying in the realm of provability.
Secondly, we should get rid of the use of full induction. This is done by switching to a cut
in Pudla´k’s lemma.
Thus, the formal argument runs as follows. Reason in S1
2
and assume U ✄ V .
We fix some j : U✄V . By Pudla´k’s lemma, Lemma 5.3, we now find7 a definable U -cut
J and a j, J-function h such that
∀∆0ϕ ✷U∀ ~x∈J (ϕ
j(h(~x))↔ ϕ(~x)).
We shall see that for this cut J we have that
∀Π1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ
J). (18)
Therefore, we fix some π ∈ Π1 and assume ✷V π. Let ϕ(x) ∈ ∆0 be such that π = ∀x ϕ(x).
Thus we have ✷V ∀x ϕ(x), hence by theorems interpretability
✷U∀x (δ(x)→ ϕ
j(x)). (19)
We are to see
✷U∀x (J(x)→ ϕ(x)). (20)
7Remark 5.4 ensures us that we can find them also in the case of theorems interpretability.
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To see this, we reason in U and fix x such that J(x). By definition of J , h(x) is defined.
By the definition of h, we have δ(h(x)), whence by (19), ϕj(h(x)). Pudla´k’s lemma now
yields the desired ϕ(x). As x was arbitrary, we have proved (20).
So far, we have not used the reflexivity of U . We shall now see that
∀∀Π
b
1π (✷Uπ
J → ✷Uπ)
holds for any U -cut J whenever U is reflexive. For this purpose, we fix some π ∈ ∀Πb1,
some U -cut J and assume ✷Uπ
J . Thus, ∃n ✷U,nπ
J and also ∃n ✷U✷U,nπ
J . If π = ∀x ϕ(x)
with ϕ(x) ∈ Πb1, we get ∃n ✷U✷U,n∀x (x ∈ J → ϕ(x)), whence also
∃n ✷U∀x ✷U,n(x ∈ J → ϕ(x)).
By Lemma 4.2 and Remark 4.3, for large enough n, this implies
∃n ✷U∀x ✷U,nϕ(x)
and by Lemma 2.4 (only here we use that π ∈ ∀Πb1) we obtain the required ✷U∀x ϕ(x). ⊣
Again, by [16] we note that V being reflexive can never be a sufficient condition for
∀U [U ✄ V → ∀∀Π
b
1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ)].
The main work on the Orey-Ha´jek characterization has now been done. We can easily
extract some useful, mostly well-known corollaries.
Corollary 6.7. If U is a reflexive theory, then
T ⊢ U ✄ V ↔ ∀x ✷UConx(V ).
Here T contains exp and ✄ denotes smooth interpretability.
Corollary 6.8. (In S1
2
:) If V is a reflexive theory, then the following are equivalent.
1. U ✄ V
2. ∃U-CutJ ∀Π1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ
J)
3. ∃U-CutJ ∀x ✷UCon
J
x(V )
Proof. This is part of Theorem 2.3 from [16]. (1) ⇒ (2) is already proved in Lemma 6.6,
(2) ⇒ (3) follows from the transitivity of V and (3) ⇒ (1) is a sharpening of Lemma 6.1.
which closely follows Theorem 4.7. Note that ✄ may denote denote smooth or theorems
interpretability. ⊣
Corollary 6.9. If V is reflexive, then
S12 ⊢ U ✄t V ↔ U ✄s V.
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Proof. By Remark 5.4 and Corollary 6.8. ⊣
Corollary 6.10. If U and V are both reflexive theories we have that the following are
provably equivalent in S1
2
.
1. U ✄ V
2. ∀∀Π
b
1π (✷V π → ✷Uπ)
3. ∀x ✷UConx(V )
Proof. If we go (1)⇒ (2)⇒ (3)⇒ (1) we do not need the totality of exp that was needed
for (1)⇒ (3). ⊣
As an application we can, for example, see that PA✄PA+ InCon(PA). It is well known
that PA is essentially reflexive which means that any finite extension of it is reflexive. So,
we use Corollary 6.10 and, it is sufficient to show that PA + InCon(PA) is Π1-conservative
over PA.
So, suppose that PA + InCon(PA) ⊢ π for some Π1-sentence π. In other words PA ⊢
✷⊥ → π. We shall now see that PA ⊢ ✷π → π, which by Lo¨b’s Theorem gives us PA ⊢ π.
Thus, in PA, assume ✷π. Suppose for a contradiction that ¬π. By Σ1-completeness
we also get ✷¬π, which yields ✷⊥ with the assumption ✷π. But we have ✷⊥ → π and we
conclude π. A contradiction, so that indeed PA✄ PA+ InCon(PA).
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